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Federalism in Canada
Honourable John D. Richard'
INTRODUCTION
Today, I would like to provide an overview of Canadian federal-
ism: the historical circumstances which gave rise to it, the evolu-
tion of the Constitution on which it is based, and the way it has
both shaped and protected certain fundamental aspects of con-
temporary Canadian society, namely, bilingualism, bijuralism,
multiculturalism, and a respect for human rights. Before I exam-
ine the past, however, a brief description of present-day Canada is
in order.
Originally a union of four provinces, Canada is now composed of
ten provinces and three territories. Canada became a federation
in 1867, which makes it the third oldest federation in the world
today, after the United States and Switzerland.! While the term
"confederation" is often used by Canadians when referring to the
union of 1867, the term actually refers to the process of bringing
the provinces together into a federation, rather than the adoption
of a confederal structure.
Federalism in Canada is a reflection of its unique geography
and history. It is a large country, second only to Russia in territo-
rial size,3 but it has a relatively small population of approximately
thirty-two million people. The composition of that population has
also changed since confederation. In 1867, Canada was primarily
a mix of English and French colonists. The first settlers from
France arrived in 1604. Today, the Canadian population includes
individuals from virtually every country in the world. Notwith-
standing this, a French-speaking majority has endured within one
province: Quebec. About eighty percent of the French Canadian
1. Chief Justice, Federal Court of Appeal, Ottawa-Canada. I wish to acknowledge the
thorough research assistance of my law clerk, JoAnne Lagendyk, in the preparation of this
paper as well as the contribution of my former law clerk, Melanie Mallet.
2. RONALD L. WATTs, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 3 (McGill-Queen's University
Press 2nd ed. 1999). (The U.S. transformed its confederation into a federation in 1789, as
did Switzerland in 1848).
3. Id. at 23.
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population lives in Quebec, where they constitute over eighty per-
cent of the population.4
A federal system reconciles a desire for overall unity with a de-
sire for regional autonomy.5 A country with a federal system has
independent national and regional governments, each operating,
theoretically at least, in its own discrete jurisdictional area.6 Such
is the case in Canada. Political power is shared by two orders of
government: the federal government on the one hand, and the
provincial governments on the other. Within their defined spheres
of jurisdiction, the two orders are equal; there is no superior-
subordinate relationship. The distinct functions of the provincial
legislatures and of the Parliament of Canada were established in
the British North America Act, which was later renamed the Con-
stitution Act, 1867.
Like both the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada
has a bicameral legislature which is composed of the House of
Commons and the Senate. However, the Canadian Senate bears
more resemblance to the United Kingdom's House of Lords than it
does the United States Senate. Its members are appointed,7
rather than elected, and it is dominated by the House of Com-
mons. In addition, rather than each province having an equal
number of Senators, as in the United States model, the Canadian
Constitution specifies the number of Senators that are to come
from each province.8 In Canada, Senate representation is based
on regions instead of constituent units. This was done to ensure
that Canada's linguistic minority, concentrated primarily in Que-
bec, was adequately represented.
Canada has a parliamentary system, like the United Kingdom,
rather than a congressional one, like the United States. This
means that, in Canada, the executive functions are divided be-
tween a formal executive (the Governor General) and a political
executive (the Prime Minister and his cabinet).
4. WATTS, supra note 2, at 24.
5. RICHARD J. VAN LOON & MICHAEL S. WHITINGTON, THE CANADIAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM: ENVIRONMENT, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 188 (McGraw-Hill Ryerson 4th ed. 1987).
6. Id.
7. CAN. CONST. (CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867), pt. TV, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,
No.5, § 5.
8. CAN. CONST. (CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867), pt. IV. The Senate usually has 105 mem-
bers: 24 from the Maritime provinces (10 from Nova Scotia, 10 from New Brunswick, four
from Prince Edward Island); 24 from Quebec; 24 from Ontario; 24 from the Western prov-
inces (six (6) each from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia); six (6)
from Newfoundland and Labrador; and one (1) each from the Yukon Territory, the North-
west Territories and Nunavut.
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In a congressional system, the President acts as Chief of State,
Head of Government, and leader of a major political party. In con-
trast, the Prime Minister is not Canada's Chief of State; this func-
tion is entrusted to the Governor General.9 Formal executive
power in Canada is vested in the Crown, and in a formal sense,
Canada has a monarchic form of government.
But while the Governor General theoretically exercises all of the
rights and privileges of the Queen in right of Canada,1" the real
power is actually exercised by the Prime Minister and his cabinet.
Executive decisions made by the Prime Minister and his cabinet
are, in effect, rubber stamped by the Governor General. In fact, it
is a well established convention that the Governor General acts
only on the advice of the government of the day.
Another difference between congressional and parliamentary
systems is that a congressional government is based on a separa-
tion of powers while a parliamentary government is based on a
concentration of powers. The American President and his cabinet
cannot be members of either House of Congress. Nor can the
President or any member of his cabinet appear in Congress to in-
troduce a bill, answer questions, or rebut attacks on policies."
On the other hand, the Prime Minister and every other Minister
is, by custom, a member of either one House or the other. Gov-
ernment bills must be introduced by a Minister or someone speak-
ing on his behalf, and Ministers must appear in Parliament to de-
fend government bills and answer daily questions on government
actions or policies. 2 A parliamentary system is based on the prin-
ciple of fusion of executive and legislative powers. Whichever
party has a majority of seats in the legislature also controls the
executive branch, thus the same political leaders operate both the
executive and legislative branches of government. This bridge
between the legislative and executive parts of the government is
the cabinet, which is collectively responsible to the legislature for
its actions and retains office only so long as it receives majority
support in the legislature. 3
9. CAN. CONST. (CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867), pt. IV.
10. Id.
11. EUGENE A. FORSEY, How CANADIANS GOVERN THEMSELVES 26 (Library of Parlia-
ment 5th ed. 2003).
12. Id.
13. RONALD G. LANDES, THE CANADIAN POLITY, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 24
(Prentice Hall Canada 4th ed. 1995).
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While a parliamentary system is marked by this fusion of pow-
ers, a congressional system, on the other hand, is characterized by
a separation of powers - each branch of government acts inde-
pendently from the others. This separation is maintained through
a series of checks and balances, specific constitutional powers
granted to each branch to control certain aspects of the operation
of the other branches of government. For example, the President
may veto a law that was passed by the legislature. For its part,
the legislature is given a countercheck that enables it to override a
presidential veto by a two-thirds vote in both Houses. 4
The government of the Canadian provinces mirrors that of the
national government. At the provincial level, the executive is split
between a Premier and a Lieutenant-Governor. However, the
provinces are no longer bicameral. They have all abolished their
Senates.
Canada is, of course, a democratic state. The relationship be-
tween democracy and federalism means that, in Canada, there
may be different and equally legitimate majorities in different
provinces and territories as well as at the federal level. No one
majority is more or less "legitimate" than the others as an expres-
sion of democratic opinion. Different provinces are able to pursue
specific policies that respond to the particular concerns of the peo-
ple in that province. At the same time, federalism allows Canadi-
ans to achieve their goals on a national scale through a federal
government acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. Canadian
federalism enables citizens to participate concurrently in different
collectivities and to pursue goals at both a provincial and a federal
level.'5
ORIGINS OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM
In order to appreciate contemporary Canadian federalism, it is
necessary to have an understanding of the forces that shaped it.
Canadian federalism was a political and legal response to the un-
derlying social and political realities of British North America in
the mid-nineteenth century.
In 1860, British North America was made up of the colonies of
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward
Island on the Atlantic coast, each one separate and having very
14. Id. at 25.
15. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at paragraph 66.
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little to do with the others. On the Pacific coast were Vancouver
Island and British Columbia. In the center was the large United
Province of Canada, which consisted of the French-Catholic domi-
nated Lower Canada and the English-Protestant dominated Up-
per Canada. Although the colonies were geographically, politi-
cally, and economically separate from one other, they were all
closely tied to Britain. 16 In 1841, the formerly separate colonies of
Lower and Upper Canada were forced by Britain into an involun-
tary and largely unhappy political union. Although Lower Canada
had a much larger population than Upper Canada, the two prov-
inces were given the same number of elected representatives, a
situation the French Canadians in Lower Canada resented.
17
In addition to pressures within the colonies, there were threats
from the United States to the south. First, there was the danger
of the Fenians, an Irish Catholic group that hoped to free Ireland
by attacking British colonies in North America. In 1866, 1,500
Fenians were repelled when they invaded Upper Canada."8
Then there was the threat of annexation by the United States,
which had already invaded unsuccessfully twice: once in 1775,
when an American army had invaded Quebec and captured Mont-
real, 9 and again in 1812, when the Americans had invaded the
Niagara region of Ontario.0
British public opinion had been in favor of reducing, if not
eliminating government spending in North America, especially for
defense, and it appeared that the colonies might be left to fend for
themselves in the case of another attack.2'
Thus, it was in 1864, motivated by a desire to create mutual
commercial ties and by the threat of annexation by the United
16. CBC, Canada, A People's History: The Great Enterprise: Pre-Confederation British
North America,
http://history.cbc.ca/history/?MIval=EpContent.html&episode-id=8&series-id=l&lang=E&c
hapter-id=1 (A People's History).




18. CBC, Canada, A People's History: The Great Enterprise: The Fenians,
http://history.cbc.ca/history/9MIval=EpContent.html&series-id= 1&episodeid=8&chapter_i
d=2&pageid=3&lan=E.
19. MASON WADE, THE FRENCH CANADIANS, 1760-1945,69-70 (1956).
20. PIERRE BERTON, THE INVASION OF CANADA 100 (1980).






States, that representatives of the Atlantic provinces and the
province of Canada met in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island,
to consider a union of British North America.
Several models were discussed. While there was a good deal of
support for a unitary model, there was also a good deal of resis-
tance. In particular, while Quebec wished to share in the devel-
opment of the continent as well as to gain access to the markets of
the other provinces, it refused to accept the minority position that
would have been its lot in a unitary state. Such a position would
have been unacceptable to the people of Quebec, who took pride in
their separateness and wished to preserve their faith, their lan-
guage, their laws, and their culture. They believed that a federal
union, which recognized and supported the autonomy of each con-
stituent unit, would best preserve their distinctiveness."
Therefore, after much discussion, the representatives decided to
adopt a federal model for their union, believing that a federation
would protect the interests of its members while allowing them to
reap the benefits of a larger political unit. Not all provinces be-
lieved that a federation was the best solution. Prince Edward Is-
land and Newfoundland were not convinced that a federation
would allow them to preserve their cultural distinctiveness. For
this reason, they did not join the federation until later: Prince
Edward Island in 1873, and Newfoundland in 1949.3
The federation that was ultimately adopted was a legal recogni-
tion of the diversity that existed among the initial members of
Confederation. By granting significant powers to the provincial
governments, diversity was accommodated within the framework
of a single nation. For British North America, "federalism was the
political mechanism by which diversity could be reconciled with
unity."
24
Having decided on a federal union, the representatives met
again a month later in Quebec City to work out the details, most
significantly the orientation of the federation: Should it have a
strong or weak central authority? There were proponents for both
sides. The representative from New Brunswick argued that tak-
ing away powers from the provinces would turn them into mere
22. Marianopolis College, Readings in Quebec History: Federalism,
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/readings/federal.htm.
23. Errol P. Mendes, Shorter Commentarie: The Canadian Constitution and Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: A Global Template for Democratic Pluralism, 21 Windsor Y.B. Ac-
cess. Just. 543, 546 (2002).
24. Secession Reference, supra note 15, at paragraph 43.
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municipal corporations.25 Proponents of a strong central power
looked to the United States, which was in the midst of a civil war,
and blamed what they saw as "federal-state tensions run amuck"
6
on that federation's weak central authority. Hoping to avoid a
similar fate, they wished to orient their union around the center.
Sir John A. Macdonald, conservative leader in Upper Canada
and subsequently Prime Minister of Canada for most of the next
twenty-five years, believed that the primary error of the United
States was that, at the formation of its Constitution, each state
reserved to itself all sovereign rights, except for the small portion
that was delegated to the central authority. Macdonald felt that
this process had to be reversed and the central government
strengthened by conferring on the provinces only those powers
that were required for local purposes.27 Macdonald also believed
that only a strongly united Canada could guarantee protection
from another military attack by the United States. 8
CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867
After much spirited debate on the merits of both versions of fed-
eralism, Macdonald and his supporters ultimately prevailed. The
Constitution that came into being on July 1, 1867, established a
federation that was highly centralized. For example, the federal
government was granted unlimited taxing powers, while the prov-
inces were limited to direct taxes within the province. In addition,
the federal government could assume jurisdiction over any local
work or undertaking, even if located wholly within a province, by
declaring it to be for the general advantage of Canada and thus
under its legislative jurisdiction. Furthermore, the federal gov-
ernment was given the ability, under certain circumstances, to
overrule provincially-enacted legislation.
Not only was the federal government granted more exclusive
powers than were held in the already-existing federations of the
United States and Switzerland, but residual powers were also
given to the federal government through its general power over
"peace, order and good government," in contrast to the Swiss,
25. William C. Hodge, Patriation of the Canadian Constitution: Comparative Federal-
ism in a New Context, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 585, 603 (1985).
26. Id. at 600.
27. Id. at 602.
28. Id. at 603.
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American, and later, Australian models, in which residual powers
were assigned to the states or cantons.29
The federal government was further strengthened by the fact
that Senators were appointed for life by the Governor General in
council, which, as we saw earlier, was in reality the federal gov-
ernment. In contrast, in 1867, United States Senators were ap-
pointed by the state legislatures to represent state interests
within the federal legislature. While United States Senators are
now elected directly by the people of the state, Canadian Senators
are still appointed by the federal government.
The federal government was also given the authority to estab-
lish a general court of appeal for Canada and to name judges to its
bench. The government exercised this power in 1875 when it cre-
ated the Supreme Court of Canada, which is now the final referee
of constitutional disputes between the federal and provincial gov-
ernments, ° having reclaimed this role from the Privy Council in
1949. The Canadian Parliament was also empowered to appoint
all provincial judges, from the district level all the way up to the
appellate level, and was responsible for judicial salaries, allow-
ances, and pensions.
The Constitution embodied a compromise under which the
original provinces agreed to federate. Preservation of the rights of
minorities was a condition on which such minorities entered into
the federation and the foundation upon which the whole structure
was subsequently erected.
31
The Constitution that delineated the federal-provincial division
of powers was called the British North America Act, 1867. Later
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, it created the Dominion of
Canada by uniting the provinces of Canada East, Canada West,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. It also provided the framework
for the admission of other parts of British North America and es-
tablished the division of legislative powers between the Federal
Parliament and the provincial legislatures. The Constitution
bound both orders of government, as well as the executive branch.
Unlike the American Constitution of 1787 and its amendments,
the bulk of Canadian constitutional law is not contained in a sin-
29. Government of Canada, Privy Council Office, The Constitutional File and the Unity
File: The History of Canada's Constitutional Development,
http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp?Language=E&Page=Home [hereinafter The Con-
stitutional File].
30. Id.
31. Hodge, supra note 25, at 617.
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gle document. Subsection 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 in-
cludes a non-exhaustive list of the twenty-five constitutional texts
that make up Canada's Constitution. However, a large part of
Canada's Constitution, and some would say the most fundamental
parts of it, consist of unwritten principles which have infused and
shaped it. They are known as constitutional conventions.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
Constitutional conventions have been described as "rules of po-
litical behaviour that are regarded by political actors as binding
on them but are not enforced directly by the courts"32 or as "rules
of behaviour that ought to be regarded as binding."33 Or, as the
Supreme Court of Canada has succinctly put it: "[Clonstitutional
conventions plus constitutional law equal the total constitution of
the country."34
The Prime Minister and the cabinet are not mentioned in the
Constitution Act, 1867. Neither is the assumption that a Cabinet
Minister will hold a seat in the House of Commons. The practice
that the defeat of a major piece of government legislation is also a
defeat of the government is not specified in any document.35 These
are all basic features of Canada's government, yet none of them
are to be found in the written Constitution.36 They are constitu-
tional conventions.
Conventions are the fundamental but unwritten principles that
provide the underpinnings of our Constitution: federalism, democ-
racy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, respect for minority
rights, and judicial independence.38 Earlier this year, the Su-
preme Court suggested that another fundamental unwritten prin-
cipal be recognized: the respect for human rights and freedoms.39
These underlying principles "infuse our Constitution and breathe
life into it." ° They are essential to the ongoing process of constitu-
32. PATRICK J. MONAHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (2d ed. 2002).
33. GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1984) (cited in ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS - THE MARRIAGE OF LAW AND POLITICS (1991)).
34. Patriation Reference Case, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
35. LANDES, supra note 13, at 79.
36. FORSEY, supra note 11, at 10.
37. Secession Reference, supra note 15, at paragraph 32.
38. R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.C 46, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43 at paragraph 83.
39. Id.
40. Secession Reference, supra note 15, at paragraph 50.
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tional development and evolution of our Constitution as a "living
tree."41
These unwritten elements make up a "global system of rules
and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional author-
ity in the whole and every part of the Canadian state.' 2 They are
a "matrix of values" that infuse
the totality of our constitutional documents. No one part
of the Constitution can be read in isolation from another,
nor does any one principle of our Constitution trump an-
other. These unwritten elements are aids in the interpre-
tation of the text of our constitutional documents and can
fill gaps in the text.43
These unwritten principles also help determine spheres of juris-
diction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of our po-
litical institutions. Most importantly, they permit our written
Constitution to remain flexible and progressive without the need
to invoke the formal and difficult process of constitutional
amendment. As former Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme
Court said:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially differ-
ent from that of construing a statute. A statute defines
present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and as
easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted
with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a con-
tinuing framework for the legitimate exercise of govern-
ment power. . .Once enacted, its provisions cannot be
easily repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capa-
ble of growth and development over time to meet new so-
cial, political and historical realities often unimagined by
its framers. 4
Constitutional conventions are crucial to the continuing vitality
and relevance of our Constitution. They give the Constitution the
flexibility to adapt to meet the needs of Canadian society as it
grows and matures.
41. Id. at paragraph 52.
42. Id. at paragraph 32.
43. Demers, supra note 38, at paragraph 83.
44. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155.
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Indeed, the Constitution has been compared to "a living tree ca-
pable of growth and expansion within its natural limits." 45 Lord
Sankey, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
stated that the Canadian Constitution was subject to development
through usage and convention. Its provisions were not to be cut
down by a narrow and technical construction but rather to be
given "a large and liberal interpretation."
A written constitution requires a flexible and progressive inter-
pretation since it is likely to remain in force for a long time and is
difficult to amend. I might add that this requirement also applies
to a Charter of Rights.
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The Constitution Act, 1867 did not contain an amending provi-
sion. Therefore, whenever Canada wished to amend its Constitu-
tion, it had to ask the British Parliament to do so. This situation
changed in 1982, when the Canadian Constitution was "repatri-
ated" by the addition of an amending clause, which permitted Ca-
nadians to amend their own Constitution without external help.
The 1982 amendment of the Constitution also included the addi-
tion of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Charter is a very significant document. Its preamble states
that "Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the su-
premacy of God and the rule of law" and sets out those rights and
freedoms which are guaranteed. Section Two protects fundamen-
tal freedoms, including freedom of conscience and religion; free-
dom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression; freedom of peace-
ful assembly; and freedom of association. Sections Three, Four,
and Five protect democratic rights such as the right to vote in an
election, the maximum duration of legislative bodies without an
election, and the annual sitting of legislative bodies. Mobility
Rights, which include the right of citizens to enter, remain in, and
leave Canada, and the right to move and gain livelihood are cov-
ered in Section Six.
Sections Seven to Fourteen concern legal rights, including the
right to life, liberty, and security of the person; protection from
unreasonable search and seizure; protection from arbitrary deten-
tion or imprisonment; specific rights upon arrest or detention;
45. Persons Case, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (citing SIR ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN, CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES 55 (1922)).
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freedom from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment; free-
dom from self-incrimination; the right to the assistance of an in-
terpreter; and rights upon being charged with an offence.
The rights to equality before and under the law, and to equal
protection and benefit of the law are protected by Section Fifteen.
The goal of Section Fifteen is to protect human dignity and has
been invoked in a wide range of cases that have one common
thread: the protection of equal membership and full participation
in Canadian society. Section Fifteen has been invoked to protect
the right of off-reserve aboriginal band members to participate in
band governance; to redress the harm done by excluding disabled
individuals from the larger society; and to include the ground of
sexual orientation in a human rights statute that prohibited dis-
crimination on other grounds.46
Sections Sixteen to Twenty-Two protect the rights to speak and
conduct affairs in either of Canada's official languages, while Sec-
tion Twenty-Three entrenches linguistic education rights of
French-speaking minorities outside Quebec and English-speaking
minorities within Quebec.
Section Twenty-Five specifies that the Charter's guarantee of
certain rights and freedoms does not abrogate or derogate from
any right or treaty pertaining to Canada's aboriginal peoples, and
Section Twenty-Six specifies that the Charter does not deny the
existence of any other rights or freedoms that already exist in
Canada.
Section Twenty-Seven directs that the Charter is to be inter-
preted in a way that preserves and enhances the multicultural
heritage of Canada, while Section Twenty-Eight guarantees that
the rights and freedoms apply equally to both sexes.
The fundamental, legal, and equality rights in the Charter are
subject to an override clause. Section Thirty-Three allows both
federal and provincial legislatures to declare that a statute shall
operate notwithstanding those sections of the Charter for a period
of five years. Sections Three to Six (democratic and mobility
rights) and Sixteen to Thirty-Two (official languages and minority
language education) are exempt from the application of the "not-
withstanding" clause.
This override is not subject to judicial review and may be re-
newed after the first five year period has expired. In the past




twenty years, the notwithstanding clause has rarely been used,
and only by provincial governments. Only three provinces have
invoked it, and, given the political fall-out that can often accom-
pany its use, it is unlikely to be employed frequently in the fu-
ture.47
The Charter "signalled an evolution in our constitutional and
political culture." 8 But a respect for individual rights has always
been a part of Canada's Constitution. By deliberately adopting a
Constitution in 1867 that was similar in principle to that of the
United Kingdom,49 Canada also chose to incorporate the principles
of civil liberties and human rights that were embedded in English
constitutional history." This history includes the Magna Carta,
the Bill of Rights of 1689, the Balfour Declaration of 1926, and the
Statute of Westminster of 1931. Canada itself added to this list
with its own Bill of Rights, enacted in 1960.
The 1982 promulgation of the Charter can be seen as a con-
tinuation of the evolution of Canada's political and constitutional
culture. The Charter was not only Canada's affirmation of its own
distinct political culture, separate from that of the United King-
dom, but also the expression of its own spirit of human rights.5
While the Charter was inspired in part by the United States Bill
of Rights, it is by no means a completely analogous document.
The Charter has a uniqueness which flows "not only from the dis-
tinctive structure of the Charter as compared to the American Bill
of Rights but also from the special features of the Canadian cul-
tural, historical, social, and political tradition."52
The drafters of the Charter were influenced by international in-
struments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights,53 the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,' and the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."
Consequently, when interpreting the Charter, Canadian courts
make reference to these international human rights instruments.
47. MONAHAN, supra note 32, at 422-23.
48. Demers, supra note 38, at paragraph 79.
49. Secession Reference, supra note 15, at paragraphs 43-44.
50. Demers, supra note 38, at paragraph 82.
51. Id. at paragraph 83.
52. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [19911 2 S.C.R. 211 at para-
graph 81.
53. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
54. G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/8106 (1948).
55. Nov. 4. 1950. 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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For example, the Supreme Court's analysis of Section Seven of the
Charter in the 2002 case of Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration)56 draws on a number of international per-
spectives on torture, citing a wide range of international treaties
and charters, including instruments that Canada is incapable of
ratifying, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights.57 The Court acknowledged that even though international
treaty norms are not, strictly speaking, binding in Canada, these
norms may nonetheless assist the Court in its interpretation of
the Charter by acting as evidence of international acceptance of
certain principles of fundamental justice.58
When interpreting the Charter, in addition to international
human rights instruments, Canadian courts also take notice of
American jurisprudence. However, the Supreme Court has
adopted a cautious attitude towards adopting American constitu-
tional interpretation, despite acknowledging that, with over 200
years of experience in constitutional interpretation, American
courts may be able to offer some guidance to the judiciary in this
area.
59
CONSTITUTIONAL VS. PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY
The Charter is recognized by our courts as the supreme law of
Canada. Subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 stipulates
that any provincial or federal law which is inconsistent with the
Charter is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force and effect.
In contrast, the American Bill of Rights applies only to federal leg-
islation as an aid to interpretation.
Prior to 1982, parliamentary supremacy reigned in Canada.
The Constitution Act, 1867 set the division of powers between Par-
liament and the provincial legislatures. Each legislature was su-
preme such that, within its jurisdiction, no other institution had
the power to declare its laws unconstitutional.
This situation changed in 1982 when the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms was adopted as part of the Constitution Act, 1982. Es-
sentially, Canada ceased to be a country of parliamentary su-
premacy and became, like the United States, a country of constitu-
tional supremacy, where the Charter is "the supreme law of Can-
56. [20021 1 S.C.R. 3 at paragraph 46.
57. (1981), 21 I.L.M. 58, Article 5.
58. Suresh, supra note 56, at paragraph 60.
59. R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 at paragraph 26.
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ada." As of 1982, if Parliament or any of the provincial legisla-
tures enacts a law that violates a section of the Charter, a court
has the power under Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to
strike this legislation down.
The power of the courts to declare a law to be contrary to the
Charter is in addition to their power of judicial review to enforce
the distribution of powers under the rules of federalism contained
in the Constitution Act, 1867.
In addition to the existing remedies for unconstitutional action,
the Charter contains its own remedy clause. This general reme-
dial provision is found in Subsection 24(1) which specifies that
anyone whose Charter rights or freedoms have been breached may
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a remedy. The court
has the discretion to award such remedy as it considers "appropri-
ate and just in the circumstances." This provision authorizes a
wide range of judicial remedies including the discretion to decide
that no remedy should be awarded.
JUSTIFIED LIMITATIONS OF GUARANTEED RIGHTS
The Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are to be accorded a "gener-
ous and expansive" interpretation. °
The need for a generous interpretation flows from the principle
that the Charter ought to be interpreted purposively. While
courts must be careful not to overshoot the actual purposes of the
Charter's guarantees, they must avoid a narrow, technical ap-
proach to Charter interpretation which could subvert the goal of
ensuring that right holders enjoy the full benefit and protection of
the Charter.61
However, the Supreme Court has also noted that the guaran-
teed "rights and freedoms are not absolute, governments and leg-
islatures could justify the qualification or infringement of these
constitutional rights."62 In effect, the rights and freedoms guaran-
teed by the Charter are subject to such reasonable limits as can be
justified in a free and democratic society.
Both the guarantee of the rights and the limitations on them
are contained in the same section, the first section of the Charter,
60. Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para-
graph 23.
61. Id.
62. Vriend v. Alberta, [19981 1 S.C.R. 493 at paragraph 131 (lacobucci, J.).
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which reads as follows: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society."
Section One sends a clear message to the courts that Charter
rights and freedoms are not absolute and that, on occasion, it is
both appropriate and necessary to limit these rights in order to
protect the interests of Canadian society as a whole. The place-
ment of the limitations clause is an indication of the primacy of
this concern: the limitations clause actually precedes the enu-
meration of individual rights.63
Accordingly, when Parliament enacts a law that limits a right or
freedom guaranteed under the Charter, that limitation must be
justified under Section One. The Supreme Court of Canada has
prescribed a single standard of justification and cast the burden of
satisfying it on the government.
Section One imposes a two-stage justification process on the
government: Does the challenged law have the effect of limiting
one of the guaranteed rights, and if so, is that limit a reasonable
one that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society? This two-stage process is similar to the review process in
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
To justify the limitation of a right, the government must satisfy
the court that the law has a sufficiently important objective, that
the law is rationally connected to this objective, that the law im-
pairs the right no more than is necessary to accomplish this objec-
tive, and that the effects of the law are proportionate to the impor-
tance of this objective.
This test was first formulated in the criminal case of R. v.
Oakes' in 1986 and has been applied consistently by the courts
ever since. The Oakes test was set out in its classic form in a re-
cent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada as follows:
The analysis under s. 1 determines whether the means
chosen to fulfill a legislative objective constitutes a rea-
sonable limit on a Charter right in a free and democratic
society. Pursuant to the well-established Oakes test, this
analysis consists of two broad inquiries: the first inquir-
63. MONAHAN, supra note 32 at ch. 13.
64. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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ies into whether the objective is sufficiently pressing and
substantial, and the second examines the proportionality
between the objective sought and the means chosen.65
Chief Justice Dickson added that the Court had to be guided by
the values and principles essential to a free and democratic soci-
ety, which included "respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation
of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity,
and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the
participation of individuals and groups in society."66
Section One of the Charter permits the courts to balance the
good of the individual with the good of society as a whole. The
words "free and democratic society" included in Section One are
crucial. The inclusion of these words as the "final standard of jus-
tification for limits on rights and freedoms" 7 refers courts to the
reason that the Charter was entrenched in the Constitution: to
ensure that Canadian society remains free and democratic.
BIJURALISM AND BICAMERALISM
Canada is one of the few countries in the world that operates
under both the common law and the civil law. Canada also enacts
legislation in its two official languages, English and French. This
combined duality has had a significant impact on Canada's brand
of federalism, which has been shaped, and continues to be shaped,
by the related concepts of bijuralism and bilingualism.
BIJURALISM
Bijuralism refers to the existence of two legal systems within a
single country.68 While nearly one hundred countries are governed
by a combination of two or more legal systems, only fifteen com-
bine the civil law and the common law.69 Rarer still is this combi-
65. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 at paragraph 233 (citing R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103, at 138-
39).
66. Oakes, supra note 64, at 136.
67. Id.
68. Alain Vauclair & Lyne Tassd, Civil Law and Common Law Balanced on the Scales
of Thdmis: The Example of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 37 R.J.T. 5 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Civil Law and Common Law].
69. World Legal Systems (1998) online: University of Ottawa,
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nation occurring in one federal national legal order, such as Can-
ada's. ° While Canada may not be the only bijural jurisdiction in
the world, it is the only G-8 nation where bijuralism is being
achieved through a formal program organized by the national gov-
ernment.71
The origins of Canada's legal duality date back more than two
centuries. Up until the British Conquest of 1760, the main source
of law in New France had been the Coutume de Paris. After the
Conquest, the British introduced the common law and equity.
However, local attachment to French private law led the British
Parliament to pass the Quebec Act in 1774, which restored French
laws and customs, with the exception of criminal and penal mat-
ters.72
Canada's two legal systems were officially entrenched in the
Constitution Act, 1867 under Subsection 92(13) which provided for
exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.
Due to this provision, the province of Quebec has been able to
make the Civil Code of Quebec the framework of its private law,
while the rest of Canada is governed by the common law. The du-
ality of Canada's legal system is also reflected in the composition
of the Supreme Court of Canada: under the Supreme Court Act,
three of its nine judges must be chosen from Quebec.
When combined with bilingualism, bijuralism presents a major
challenge to the legislative drafter. In effect, the legislator is
drafting for four audiences: civil law Francophones, common law
Francophones, civil law Anglophones, and common law Anglo-
phones.73 To respond to this need, in 1995, Canada's Justice De-
partment adopted the Policy on Legislative Bijuralism, which rec-
ognized the need to find terminology and wording that respected
the concepts, notions, and institutions proper to each of the four
audiences in the context of federal statutes and regulations.
In 1999, the Program for the Harmonization of Federal Legisla-
tion with the Civil Law of Quebec was launched. This harmoniza-
www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/ world-legal-systems/ eng-monde.html. Mixed jurisdictions of
common law and civil law include Louisiana, Quebec, St. Lucia, Puerto Rico, South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Scot-
land.
70. Civil Law and Common Law, supra note 68, at 8.
71. Mario Dion, Preface Bijuralism and Harmonization: Genesis, Department of Justice,
The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and
Canadian Bijuralism, httpJ/canada.justice.gc.ca/en/deptpub/hfl/table.html.
72. Civil Law and Common Law, supra note 68.
73. Civil Law and Common Law, supra note 68, at 8.
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tion involved reviewing all federal statutes and regulations whose
application relied on provincial private law and then harmonizing
their contents to incorporate the notions and vocabulary of Quebec
civil law.74 In June 2001, the Federal Law-Civil Law Harmoniza-
tion Act, No. 1 came into force, partially harmonizing nearly 50
statutes at once.75
Bijural states such as Canada provide valuable examples of the
way in which legal systems can co-exist in harmony. As noted by
former Supreme Court Justice, the Honourable Claire L'Heureux-
Dubd, bijural jurisdictions "exemplify the very same elements of
convergence and cross-pollination that we see taking place in the
global arena when transnational legal encounters occur, especially
those in commercial law, with NAFTA and the EU as prime ex-
amples ."
In Canada today, official legal culture is neither French nor
English, neither civil law nor common law; instead, it is all these
together, with all the ambiguity that such complexity implies.77
BILINGUALISM
In Canada, Anglophones represent about seventy-five percent of
the population, with Francophones accounting for the remaining
quarter. The majority of Francophones are concentrated in the
province of Quebec, although more than one million Francophones
make their homes in other provinces, especially New Brunswick,
Ontario, and Manitoba.
Parliament is required by Section 133 of the Constitution Act,
1867 to use both English and French in its proceedings and publi-
cations. Any member of the public therefore has a constitutional
right to communicate with and receive services from any institu-
tion of the Parliament or government of Canada in English or in
French. The equal status of French and English was recognized in
1982 by Section Eighteen of the Charter, which provides that both
language versions of statutes are equally authoritative.
These constitutional provisions require Canada to enact legisla-
tion in French and English at the federal level, and, in some cases,
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10.
76. The Honourable Claire L'Heureux-DubM, Bijuralism, A Supreme Court of Canada
Justice's Perspective, 62 La. L. Rev. 449, 450 (2002).
77. Id. at 454.
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at the provincial level as well.78 Canada is not unique in this re-
gard. Several other countries legislate in two or more languages.
Ireland, for example, enacts legislation in Irish and English,
Wales in Welsh and English, Hong Kong in Chinese and English,79
while Switzerland legislates in three languages (German, French,
and Italian). °
In some bilingual jurisdictions, such as Ireland and South Af-
rica, the constitution or a statute, provides that one language ver-
sion takes precedence over the other. In other jurisdictions, such
as Hong Kong and Wales, both language versions are equally au-
thentic.81 Canada has an "equal authenticity rule" - both the Eng-
lish and French versions of a statute have equal authority.82
Statutory interpretation in Canada therefore requires reading the
two texts in light of one another, a practice which has the poten-
tial to provide added insight to legislative intention.
When the two versions of the statute contradict each other, as
will inevitably happen from time to time, legislative drafters being
only human, after all, courts employ the "shared meaning rule" to
determine which meaning should prevail. Where there is an over-
lap in the meaning between the two language versions that are
otherwise at variance, the meaning that is shared by both versions
is the one to be used, unless it is for some reason unacceptable.
8 3
The adoption of statutes in both languages enhances the clarity
of legal drafting. Bilingual drafting and legal translation fre-
quently highlight ambiguities in the first language, allowing revi-
sions to be made before final adoption of the statute. Two versions
of a statute can also be of great assistance when a court is asked
to interpret its terms "because there is then an additional tool to
determine the true legislative intent."'
78. The Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut are subject to the same require-
ments as the federal government; Quebec is required by the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 133;
Manitoba by the Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3, s. 23, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,
No. 8; New Brunswick by the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 16(2); Ontario by French Language
Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-32, s.3.
79. Law Drafting Division, Hong Kong Department of Justice, Legislative Drafting in
Hong Kong: Crystallization in Definitive Form, 2nd ed., online:
http://www.justice.gov.hk/ldhkv2e.pdf at 6.2.
80. Paul Salembier, Rethinking the Interpretation of Bilingual Legislation: the Demise
of the Shared Meaning Rule 35:1 Ottawa Law Rev. 77 (2003).
81. Id. at 78.
82. L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 76, at 452.
83. Salembier, supra note 80, at 80-81.
84. Andrew Gray & Eleni Yianpakis, Language, Culture and Interpretation: An Inter-
view with Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache, 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 73, 80 (2000).
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The Official Languages Act,85 adopted first in 1969 and amended
in 1988, is a legislative measure taken to fulfil the constitutional
obligation of governmental bilingualism in Canada. The Act's
preamble underlines the equal status of English and French in
institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada as well
as the guarantee of full and equal access in both languages to Par-
liament, to the laws of Canada, and to the courts.86
The objectives of the Official Languages Act include ensuring
respect, equality of status, and equal rights regarding the use of
English and French as the official languages of Canada, particu-
larly with respect to their use in parliamentary proceedings, legis-
lation, administration of justice, and in the work of federal institu-
tions. In addition, the Act supports the development of English
and French linguistic minority communities and promotes the
equality of status and use of both languages within Canadian so-
ciety.
In fact, the objectives and values embodied in the Official Lan-
guages Act have given it a special place in the Canadian legal
framework. This status was recognized by the Federal Court of
Appeal in 1991 when it held that the Act was not an ordinary
statute, but rather one that belonged to the privileged category of
quasi-constitutional legislation which reflected "certain basic goals
of our society." Due to its status, the Act must be interpreted "as
to advance the broad policy considerations underlying it." 7
Over a decade later, in 2002, the Supreme Court confirmed the
Act's quasi-constitutional status, a status justified by its constitu-
tional roots and its crucial role in relation to bilingualism."
The legislative protection given to language rights is essential to
their preservation. Language rights cannot exist in a vacuum. As
Justice Bastarache of the Supreme Court said, "The freedom to
choose is meaningless in the absence of a duty of the State to take
positive steps to implement language guarantees."89 The goal of
the Official Languages Act is to ensure that all Canadians enjoy
the ability to exercise their linguistic choice.
The Supreme Court demonstrated its commitment to bilingual
legal practice in Canada, most notably in its 1985 decision in Re
85. R.S. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.).
86. Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), [2002] 2
S.C.R. 773 at paragraph 21.
87. Canada (Attorney General) v. Viola, [1991] 1 F.C. 373 at 386.
88. Lavigne, supra note 86, at paragraph 23.
89. R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 at paragraph 20 (Bastarache, J.).
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Manitoba Language Rights.9 ° In this decision, the Court consid-
ered the legality of the laws of Manitoba, which since 1890 had
been enacted almost exclusively in English only, despite the exis-
tence of an 1870 federal statute which required the province to
publish its laws and regulations in both French and English.
The Court ruled that all the unilingual laws were invalid but
suspended this declaration temporarily to avoid a legal vacuum.
The decision recognized the pivotal place that language occupies
in the lives of human beings:
The importance of language rights is grounded in the es-
sential role that language plays in human existence, de-
velopment and dignity. It is through language that we
are able to form concepts; to structure and order the
world around us. Language bridges the gap between iso-
lation and community, allowing humans to delineate the
rights and duties they hold in respect of one another, and
thus to live in society.9'
MULTICULTURALISM
Multicultural societies became common in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries.92 Nearly 95% of people in the
world today live in multicultural states. Forty percent of these
people live in federal states,93 so Canada is hardly unique in that
its population is made up of a wide range of ethnicities.
Federalism can be an attractive option to countries with multi-
cultural societies since its combination of unity and diversity of-
fers these states the possibility of having their cake and eating it
too.94 Federalism allows minorities to become majorities in sub-
national units. It provides for the recognition and acceptance of
different languages, religions, and cultures. Most of all, federal-
ism embraces and promotes diversity, increasing its legitimacy in
90. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
91. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 744.
92. CHERYL SAUNDERS, Federalism, Decentralisation and Conflict Management in
Multicultural Societies, in Raoul Blindenbacher & Arnold Koller, eds., FEDERALISM IN A
CHANGING WORLD: LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND, PROCEEDINGS
AND PLENARY SPEECHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FEDERALISM 2002, 33
(2002).
93. Thomas Fleiner, Walter KIflin, & Wolf Linder et al., Federalism, Decentralisation
and Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies, in Blindenbacher et al., FEDERALISM
IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 92, at 198.
94. Saunders, supra note 92, at 34.
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the eyes of the entire population and not just of a dominant
group.
95
Several countries have adopted federalism as a way to accom-
modate minority groups, including Switzerland (to accommodate
the French and Italians), Belgium (to accommodate the Flemish),
Spain (to accommodate the Catalans and the Basques) and, of
course, Canada, which adopted federalism as a way to protect the
rights of the Quebecois."
This is not to say that all federal systems were adopted as a re-
sponse to cultural pluralism. In the United States, Australia,
Germany, and Brazil, for example, the sub-national units do not
correspond in any way with distinct cultural communities who
wish to retain their self-government and cultural distinctiveness.97
Federalism in those countries is not used as a way to protect the
cultural integrity of a minority group, in the way that the Cana-
dian province of Quebec protects the distinctiveness of the primar-
ily Francophone Quebecois.98
Diversity has been a fundamental characteristic of Canada since
its beginnings. Canada's legislative framework, which was ini-
tially conceived to protect the interests of two cultures, has been
expanded and strengthened in order to better reflect Canada's
support of the growing cultural diversity of its citizens.99 Respect
for Canada's ethnic minorities is entrenched in the Constitution
under Section Twenty-Seven of the Charter, which requires that
the Constitution be interpreted in a way that preserves and en-
hances Canada's multicultural heritage.
In 1969, the Official Languages Act, which established English
and French as the official languages of Canada, also included rec-
ommendations aimed at non-English and non-French groups, en-
couraging federal institutions and agencies to encourage cultural
diversification within a bilingual framework. These recommenda-
tions, coupled with the changing social, cultural, economic, and
95. Id.
96. Will Kymlicka, Secession: Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad, 13 Can.
J.L. & Juris. 207 at paragraph 12 (2000).
97. Id. at paragraph 13.
98. Id.
99. Government of Canada, Minister of State (Multiculturalism), Canadian Heritage,
The Canadian Multiculturalism Act - 15 years later,
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/multi/reports/ann2002-2003/01-e.cfm?nav=2Multi
culturalism - 15 years later].
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political face of Canada, led to the announcement of the Canadian
Multiculturalism Policy in 1971.100
Addressing the House of Commons, the Right Honourable Pi-
erre Elliot Trudeau, then Prime Minister of Canada, indicated his
support for a "policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual frame-
work" as the "most suitable means of assuring the cultural free-
dom of Canadians." "National unity, if it is to mean anything in
the deeply personal sense," said Mr. Trudeau,
must be founded on confidence in one's own individual
identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others
and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assump-
tions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help cre-
ate this initial confidence. It can form the base of a soci-
ety which is based on fair play for all.''
Mr. Trudeau committed the Canadian government to support
the various cultures and ethnic groups that made up Canadian
society and to encourage them "to share their cultural expression
and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life
for us all." Emphasizing the need for government protection of mi-
norities, Mr. Trudeau concluded:
We are free to be ourselves. But this cannot be left to
chance. It must be fostered and pursued actively. If
freedom of choice is in danger for some ethnic groups, it is
in danger for all. It is the policy of this government to
eliminate any such danger and to "safeguard" this free-
dom.
When the Canadian Multiculturalism Act' was passed unani-
mously by the Parliament in 1988, it made Canada the first coun-
try in the world to pass a national multiculturalism law that
clearly affirmed multiculturalism as a fundamental value.103
Building on Section Twenty-Seven of the Charter, which calls for
the Charter to be interpreted "in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of
Canadians," the Act also drew its strength from the equality pro-
100. Id.
101. Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau, House of Commons, October 8, 1971
http://www.canadahistory.com/sections/documents/ trudeau- on multiculturalism.htm.
102. R.S., 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.).
103. Multiculturalism - 15 years later, supra note 99.
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visions in the Citizenship Act, the Canadian Human Rights Act,
and the Official Languages Act. In addition, the Canadian Multi-
culturalism Act fully supported international human rights
agreements."'
Under the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, federal institutions
are committed to carrying out their activities in a way that recog-
nizes and promotes the understanding that multiculturalism is a
reflection of the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society
and which acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian
society to preserve, enhance, and share their cultural heritage.
The goal of Canada's multiculturalism policy is to enable the in-
tegration of minority Canadians while encouraging federal institu-
tions to remove discriminatory barriers to employment, service
delivery, and civic participation. 6
The Canadian federal system permits the balanced development
of minority and majority that is essential to the existence of an
actively multicultural society. As noted earlier, federalism can be
described as a balance between self-rule and shared rule. Such a
balance allows cultural communities, such as the province of Que-
bec, the opportunity to promote their culture within their territo-
ries.1°7
Federalism offers Canada a constitutional mechanism which not
only tolerates and promotes diversity but also enables diverse
communities to participate in government. 8 Canada, as a multi-
cultural state, has used federalism to derive maximum benefit
from diversity, and to constitutionally implement the principle of
unity in diversity. In this way, Canadian society as a whole can
participate in the pursuit of universal values without sacrificing
the specific values of its own cultural communities."'
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982 clearly stipulates that the
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are recognized and affirmed and that such rights are
guaranteed equally to male and female persons. The "aboriginal
104. Multiculturalism - 15 years later, supra note 99.
105. Canadian Multiculturalism Act, s. 3(1)(a).
106. Id.
107. Fleiner, Kuin, Linder, et al., supra note 93, at 206.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 207.
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peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit, and M6tis peoples
of Canada.
There is no one document in which the rights mentioned in Sec-
tion 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 are enumerated. It has
therefore been up to the courts to determine the content and ex-
tent of these rights.
In determining what constitutes aboriginal rights, the Supreme
Court has emphasized the importance of recognizing that these
rights are specific rights which are "held by aboriginal people be-
cause they are aboriginal,"11 ° distinguishing them from more gen-
eral human rights to which every person is entitled. The Court
stated that
the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized
and affirmed by s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when
Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples
were already here, living in communities on the land, and
participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for
centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others,
which separates aboriginal peoples from all other minor-
ity groups in Canadian society and which mandates their
special legal, and now constitutional, status."'
In considering how to best define aboriginal rights in the 1996
case of R. v. Van der Peet,"2 the Court examined decisions from the
United States and Australia before formulating the following gen-
eral test: In order to be an aboriginal right protected by Section
35(1), the "activity must be an element of a practice, custom or
tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group
claiming the right.""
The Supreme Court also recognized that Section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 "represents the culmination of a long and
difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the
constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights.""4 For this reason,
the Court held that the words in Section 35(1) are to be accorded a
"generous (and) liberal interpretation.""5
110. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at paragraph 20.
111. Id. at paragraph30.
112. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
113. Van der Peet, supra note 110, at paragraph 46.
114. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at paragraph 53.
115. Id. at paragraph 56.
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Despite an obligation to interpret the constitutional provision
generously, the rights recognized and affirmed under Section 35(1)
are nevertheless subject to reasonable limitations, in the same
way as the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are
limited by the application of Section One, as discussed earlier.
But rather than being contained in a discrete section of the Con-
stitution, the interpretation of the aboriginal rights, and the rea-
sonable limitations on them, are derived from general principles of
"constitutional interpretation, principles relating to aboriginal
rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional provision it-
self."11
There are four steps to determining if a right under Section
35(1) has been infringed:
First, a court must determine whether an applicant has
demonstrated that he or she was acting pursuant to an
aboriginal right. Second, a court must determine
whether that right has been extinguished. Third, a court
must determine whether that right has been infringed.
Finally, a court must determine whether the infringe-
ment is justified.'17
Once it has been determined that the applicant was acting pur-
suant to a non-extinguished aboriginal right, the burden then
shifts to the government to show that the limitation "constitutes
legitimate regulation of a constitutional aboriginal right.""8 The
government must demonstrate that the objective of the legislation
is "compelling and substantial.""9 In addition to assessing the leg-
islation in light of its objective, courts must also consider the "spe-
cial trust relationship and the responsibility of the government
vis-A-vis aboriginals."2 °
The infringement must also meet the test of minimal impair-
ment: If the legislative objective is valid, has the aboriginal right
been affected only to the extent that is absolutely necessary?
Other considerations are included in this step as well, such as
whether adequate compensation has been offered, or whether the
aboriginal people themselves were consulted. 2'
116. Id. at paragraph 55.
117. R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 110, at paragraph 2.
11& Sparrow, supra note 114, at paragraph 71.
119. Id. at paragraph 71.
120. Id. at paragraph 75.
121. Id. at paragraph 82.
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In short, the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights
protected under Section 35(1) "requires sensitivity to and respect
for the rights of aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government,
courts and indeed all Canadians."'22
ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM
Asymmetry in Canadian federalism means that in certain areas,
especially those which have the most impact on local populations,
such as health care and immigration, some provinces have the
option of determining for themselves the best way to administer
the resources received from the federal government.
For example, Section 94A of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives the
federal government jurisdiction over old age pensions but grants
all provinces the ability to opt out. The province of Quebec exer-
cised this option and has its own Quebec Pension Plan. The other
provinces had the same opportunity but decided not to take ad-
vantage of it. 2 ' Asymmetry can also be found in the area of immi-
gration, in which six provinces have their own specific agreements
with the federal government, each one different from the others.
More recently, the federal government signed a health care ac-
cord with the provinces in which it recognized the specificity of
Quebec society and respected its need to implement its own plan
for renewing the provincial health system. In return, Quebec
agreed to honor the goals of the overall health plan. This type of
flexibility allows Canada to respond to changes in society and to
maintain a responsive partnership between the provinces and the
central government.
CONCLUSION
Given its large geographic size, the presence of two founding
languages, and the diversity and distinctiveness of its regional
cultures and economies, Canada required a system of government
that could simultaneously promote both national and regional in-
terests. Canadian federalism, originally adopted to accommodate
two founding peoples, allows Canadian citizens to enjoy the ad-
vantages of both unity and diversity in a country that is now
122. Id. at paragraph 83.




called "home" by people from virtually every nation and culture on
the planet.
124
Federalism has given Canada "the flexibility to adapt to chang-
ing times and circumstances, permitting us to develop into one of
the most open, advanced, and prosperous nations in the world,
with an exceptional quality of life."125
What started in 1867 as a creative solution to the problem of
how to unite diverse groups that had distinct, and sometimes con-
trary, interests into one structure that could meet the constitu-
tional and economic problems of the day has evolved into a federa-
tion that reflects the values and aspirations of Canadians across
the country. Canada's Constitution, which guarantees the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the individual, not only expresses a
profound respect for human rights but also explicitly promotes
Canada's commitment to its diverse cultural communities.
124. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JEAN CHRtTIEN, Plenary speech in Blindenbacher &
Koller, supra note 92, at 592.
125. Id.
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